Inferring Co-Evolution by Lamm, Ehud & Kammar, Ohad
Inferring Coevolution
Ehud Lamm <ehudlamm@post.tau.ac.il> Tel Aviv University
Ohad Kammar <ohad.kammar@cl.cam.ac.uk> University of Cambridge
May 29, 2014
Keywords: historical explanation, evidence, coevolution, co-development,
cognitive-cultural coevolution, developmental scaffolding, recapitulation
1
Copyright Philosophy of Science 2014 Preprint (not copyedited or formatted) Please use DOI when citing or quoting
Abstract
We discuss two inference patterns for inferring the coevolution of two
characters based on their properties at a single point in time and determine
when developmental interactions can be used to deduce evolutionary order.
We discuss the use of the inference patterns we present in the biological
literature and assess the arguments’ validity, the degree of support they give
to the evolutionary conclusion, how they can be corroborated with empirical
evidence, and to what extent they suggest new empirically addressable ques-
tions. We suggest that the developmental argument is uniquely applicable to
cognitive-cultural coevolution.
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1. Introduction
An important kind of scientific explanation, most clearly found in evolutionary
biology, involves explaining the origin and properties of something (e.g., an or-
ganism) by detailing the historical sequence of events that led to it. Historical
explanations are also found in cosmology, geology and other sciences. Various
answers have been given by philosophers of science and philosophers of history
as to what makes an explanation historical and the unique features of such ex-
planations (see Kaiser and Plenge 2014). Going beyond these disputes, even a
cursory look at evolutionary explanations makes it clear that historical dynamics
can lead to surprising results that are hard if not impossible to explain ahistorically
(e.g., vestigial traits; the necessity of preadaptations in the evolution of complex
traits; the effects of historical population bottlenecks). The significance of such
factors is an important aspect of the debates concerning adaptationism in evo-
lutionary biology (Gould and Lewontin 1979). One kind of evidence appealed
to by historical explanations is diachronic evidence, that is evidence that can at
least be chronologically ordered if not precisely dated. For example, studying
skull fossils to piece together the eye structure in various evolutionary stages. In
contrast, the comparative method in evolutionary biology is a paradigmatic case of
the use of synchronic evidence from multiple organisms to deduce historical facts.
Working with living organisms typically results in synchronic evidence, though
experimental evolution produces diachronic evidence in the lab. Likewise, fossil
data are typically used as diachronic evidence, though analyzing multiple fossils
from a single point in time is an exercise in the use of synchronic evidence. Here,
we are interested in identifying historical facts based on synchronic evidence, of
the sort readily obtained from extant organisms.
We look at arguments that purport to infer past coevolution between two characters
based on the properties of an extant organism. We show that evolutionary biolo-
gists employ such inferences and we analyze their strength. We argue that these
arguments are particularly relevant for studying cognitive-cultural coevolution in
humans, an idea that has been endorsed by philosophers and evolutionary thinkers
alike.
Biologists are routinely interested in determining whether two characters of an
organism coevolved. Examples of such claims from the recent literature include:
the coevolution of speech and language (Dediu and Levinson 2013); the coevolution
between the leptin hormone that affects energy metabolism and bone (Karsenty
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and Oury 2012); moth morphological adaptations for camouflage and behavioral
phenotypes (Kang et al. 2012); and coevolution of genetic characters that affect
population structure, with those that affect social behavior (Hochberg, Rankin, and
Taborsky 2008; Powers, Penn, and Watson 2011).
To illustrate what we mean by coevolution consider the evolution of eyes. Evolu-
tionary changes to the eye were presumably related to complementary changes in
the visual cortex which had to handle the new visual input. In one scenario, cells
become light sensitive, and brain areas evolve to process the novel neural input.
Evolutionary changes to the brain enabling it to make sense of this input then cause
further evolution of the eye toward greater visual acuity, since the novel processing
in the brain benefits from improved quality of visual information. In this scenario,
coevolution in our sense has occurred.
In an alternative non-coevolutionary scenario, the changes are driven solely by
succeeding changes in eye structure, with brain changes always following suit but
not affecting the succeeding evolutionary changes in the eye. In such a scenario,
none of the changes in eye structure depend on prior evolutionary changes in the
brain’s vision processing abilities. The more specific and complex the interaction
is, the less likely this alternative becomes.
We are interested in distinguishing between such alternatives.
In our analysis, the two coevolving characters may be morphological, behavioural,
or cognitive: the shapes of the fibula and the tibia, and the eyes and the structure of
the visual cortex are examples of pairs of morphological characters; the musculature
of the leg and running are an example of a pair of morphological and physiological
characters; intelligence and tool-making are an example of a pair of cognitive and
behavioral characters; and so on for every other possible combination.
We aim to clarify the appropriate notion of coevolution and its functional and
developmental consequences. Hence our discussion is conceptual and qualitative.
Moreover, we focus on cases where it is intractable to assess the probabilities
required for using the available synchronic evidence to calculate the likelihood of
coevolution. We illustrate the importance of this task with several concrete cases.
The inference patterns we discuss provide a plausible evolutionary explanation for
the relation between the characters, and can guide further empirical investigation.
Without studying directly each character’s evolution and their relationship, we
cannot provide conclusive support for coevolution. However, the two patterns of
inductive inference we present make a coevolutionary hypothesis probable. We
show that evolutionary biologists employ such inferences, and we analyze their
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strength. In the cases we have in mind synchronic evidence originating in extant
characters is advantageous over non-extant characters, especially for behavioral
characters: they enjoy readily-available evidence, and they are open to repeatable
experimental analyses.
The first argument infers coevolution from complex mutual functional dependencies
between two characters, to the extent that neither character in its evolved form can
exist independently of the other. Such evidence favors the hytpothesis that the two
characters coevolved. For example, the complex interaction between the eye and
the visual cortex makes a unidirectional evolutionary scenario improbable. The
appeal of this argument is its simplicity, though we discuss some of its subtleties.
The second argument infers coevolution from complex mutual dependencies be-
tween the development of two characters. Moreover, it infers constraints on the
evolutionary order: certain developmentally earlier stages must have evolved before
developmentally successive stages. To safeguard against the problems with infer-
ring evolutionary order from developmental order (the recapitulation fallacy) we
use Wimsatt’s notion of generative entrenchment (Schank and Wimsatt 1986). The
argument takes its cue from evolutionary-developmental biology (evo-devo). We
view it as particularly relevant for evo-devo inspired approaches to the coevolution
of culture and cognition (e.g. Tomasello 1999; Donald 2000; Sterelny 2010; Stotz
2010). In particular, we suggest that if culture provides necessary developmental
scaffolding for cognitive development, then it is likely that characters requiring
the social scaffolding and the cognitive characters enabling this scaffolding have
coevolved.
Our contributions are:
• an explicit definition of coevolution of characters;
• two inductive inferences for coevolution based on synchronic evidence; and
• an analysis of these inferences, including their applicability, and scenarios in
which they fail.
In the next section we formally define what we mean by coevolution. Sections 3
and 4 present our arguments. Section 5 concludes.
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2. Coevolution
We are interested in cases in which two (or more) characters coevolved, in the sense
that some stages in the evolution of each required the presence of the other character
in the organism at some stage in its evolution. We note that in the literature the term
coevolution is often defined as evolutionary interactions between two populations
or species, for example an evolutionary arms-race between predator and prey.
However, we focus on evolutionary interactions between two characters that are
manifested by single individuals.
The following is a semi-formal approximation of the desired notion of coevolution:
Two characters A and B have coevolved if the evolutionary sequence of A is A-n,
. . . , A-2, A-1, A0, where A0=A, and that of B is B-m, . . . , B0, where B0=B, such that:
(a) there exist i and k such that B-k is an evolutionary cause of A-i, and
(b) there exist j and l such that A-l is an evolutionary cause of B-j.
In interpreting this definition much hangs on what is considered an evolutionary
cause. For our purposes, these consist of causes producing significant changes in a
character’s frequency in a population, i.e., any factor that plays an essential role in
explaining the transition of a population from A-i-1 to A-i. Commonly discussed and
debated evolutionary causes include: natural selection, sexual selection, migration,
and drift.
To demonstrate this definition, consider the two accounts of eye structure-visual
cortex evolution from the introduction. A simplistic evolutionary sequence of the
eye may be represented by:
A-3: Light insensitive skin-cells.
A-2: Slightly light-sensitive skin-cells.
A-1: Primitive eyes.
A0: Eyes as found today.
Similarly, a visual cortex evolutionary sequence may be simplistically represented
by:
B-2: Brain without a visual cortex.
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B-1: Brain with rudimentary processing of signals from light-sensitive cells.
B0: Visual cortex as found today.
These stages may be given a coevolutionary explanation. The stage A-2 is the
evolutionary cause of B-1, i.e., the brain evolved to take advantage of the additional
light-sensitive sensory input. The stage B-1 is an evolutionary prerequisite of A-1,
i.e., the additional processing abilities’ evolution selected for more developed eyes.
In this scenario, coevolution has occurred (i = -2, j = -1,l = -1, and k = -1).
Alternatively, here is a non-coevolutionary explanation. In this scenario, the im-
provements to the eye depend on the phenotypic plasticity of visual processing
in the brain or on general purpose processing rather than on specific evolutionary
changes in the brain. This available flexibility facilitates the selection of the fully
formed eyes first, and only when state A0 is reached the brain starts to evolve
a visual cortex (stages B-1, and B0). The brain’s evolutionary changes are all
subsequent to the eye’s evolution. This scenario is not coevolutionary: there is
no bi-directional dependence, as none of the A-i‘s depends on any of the B-i’s.
As the adaptations’ complexity increases, such a non-coevolutionary explanation,
in which all evolutionary dependencies are uni-directional and functional depen-
dencies are bi-directional, becomes unlikely. Additional evidence may make the
non-coevolutionary hypothesis more likely. For example, consider evidence that
skin-cell light-sensitivity evolves much quicker than any appropriate cerebral adap-
tation. Such evidence supports the hypothesis that skin light sensitivity evolved
independently, before the appropriate brain changes evolved, unless we have rea-
sons to suspect that the effects of the cortex on the evolution of the eyes were
profound.
A concrete illustration from the biological literature concerns the coevolution
of moth wing patterns for camouflage and their choice of resting spot and body
orientation (Kang et al. 2012). Sargent (1968) argues that adaptations in moth
behaviour were caused by the wing patterns:
In species in which melanics appear sporadically, genetic differences in
selection of backgrounds may not become established. (our boldface
emphasis)
Kang et al. later state that moth behaviour is an evolutionary cause for the wing
patterns:
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Therefore, the positioning behaviours performed by moths after land-
ing are essential to account for the almost perfect match between the
pattern on the moth wing and the pattern of the bark. (our boldface
emphasis)
These examples are coarse-grained, for example bunching together all functional
relationships of the eyes and cortex. More realistic analyses will take into account
mechanistic aspects of the two characters’ interaction, for example the organisation
of neural networks or the identification of signalling molecules. The choice of
characters depends on the hypothesis we wish to infer, i.e., which two characters
have supposedly co-evolved. We expect that inferring coevolution of coarsely
bunched characters will be easier than that of more fine-grained characters, and
less interesting. Moreover, additional evidence may lead us to revise our chosen
granularity. For example, evidence suggesting that only particular parts of the eyes
coevolved with the visual cortex, e.g. the retina, whereas other parts did not, e.g.,
tear ducts. Such evidence could include organisms with extremely primitive eyes
that have tear ducts. In such cases, we may repartition the eye into two separate
characters, only one of which coevolved with the cortex.
Our definition of coevolution is either/or in nature: either two characters have
not coevolved, or, once they have at least one evolutionary dependency on each
other, they have. This stance is methodological: by considering the minimal
coevolutionary interaction required, we emphasize the various subtleties in the
coevolutionary arguments and examples. We note, however, that characters may
influence each other’s evolution to a greater or lesser degree.
3. The Co-Dependence Argument
With a definition for coevolution under our belt, we present our first inference of
coevolution based on point-in-time evidence, the Co-Dependence Argument:
Assume two independent and well defined hereditary characters A and B such that
(1) character A in its evolved form requires B in its evolved form, and
(2) character B in its evolved form requires A in its evolved form.
Then, unless there is contrary evidence, conclude that A and B coevolved.
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By <<requires>> we mean a significant functional dependency.
Justification:
The complexity of the functional dependence of A on B postulated by assumptions
(1) and (2) implies that their functional interaction itself is the result of cumulative
evolution on both A and B.
There are three cases:
(a) the evolutionary history of A is independent of B in the sense that each stage
of the evolutionary history leading to A was unaffected by the evolutionary
state of B at the time, or
(a’) vice versa, or
(b) A and B coevolved.
According to option (a), prior to emerging in the fully formed shape we currently
encounter, the precursors of B did not influence A’s evolution in any way. It
is improbable that, throughout the evolution of the interaction of A and B, the
natural selection on A that was involved in creating their complex dependency was
unaffected by the corresponding evolutionary state of B.
Similarly, option (a’) is improbable.
Coevolution, option (b), remains as the only viable option. 
For example, consider the eye structure-visual cortex example. The visual cortex
intricately relies on eye structure, their muscular control etc., to provide it with
sensory input, while properties of the eyes are advantageous because of intricate
visual processing, for example the location of the two eyes allows stereoscopic
vision in various animals. By the Co-Dependence Argument we should conclude
coevolution occurred.
Biologists implicitly employ this line of reasoning routinely. For example, Gilbert
and Epel (2009) argue for coevolution of Wolbachia and Drosophila melanogaster
thus:
The ability of Wolbachia to rescue only females suffering from a
certain kind of Sxl mutation suggests that there is a very specific
interaction between the bacteria and the Sxl protein in the female fly.
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Such specificity of interaction between the host and parasite indicates
that the insect and the bacterium have coevolved to give Wolbachia an
important role in oogenesis in the female fly.
Here, the interaction’s specificity and its profound effects on reproduction indicate
the significant degree of functional dependence.
The level of support this inference provides for the coevolutionary hypothesis
depends on the credence assigned to assumptions (1) and (2), and the extent
to which the two characters are significantly functionally dependent. We can
deduce co-dependence from various kinds of evidence, such as the consequence of
malfunction, mechanistic and functional analysis of interactions, and functional
models of the characters, such as the models used in cognitive science.
We consider several scenarios in which the Co-Dependence Argument is not
applicable or fails.
1. Consider a case in which A and B came into existence simultaneously rather
than coevolved. The co-dependence between the characters should not
be used to conclude that they coevolved. This scenario, however, is too
miraculous to be accepted for complex characters of the sort explained by
cumulative evolution, without conclusive and uncontestable proof.
2. One interesting scenario in which the co-dependence argument is not appli-
cable is when A and B are not independent characters, but are in fact two
manifestations of the same underlying character.
For example, A and B may be two distinct behaviors that share a neural basis
that evolved for producing A and was later co-opted for B. Hence, the traits
did not coevolve. In this case the premise that A and B are independent is
not fulfilled, thus the Co-Dependence argument does not apply, and indeed
coevolution did not occur.
3. The Co-Dependence Argument fails when the trait A evolved separately
from B (as in case (a) in the justification), as demonstrated in the non-
coevolutionary account of the eye structure and visual cortex, which relied
on plasticity to explain the interactions between the evolving eye and brain.
In other words A evolved “off to the side” of B, and we call this scenario
side-by-side evolution.
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This scenario is unlikely by default. Not only the precursors of B must
not have influenced the evolution of A in any way, but there must be some
external factors that play the same role as B in establishing the functional
dependence.
This scenario also fails to explain why the two traits have become co-
dependent, if indeed they are. An advantage of the coevolutionary account, in
contrast, is that it is not merely consistent with co-dependence — it suggests
an explanation of it. Consider the non-coevolutionary eye example. Subse-
quent to the evolution of the eye in its extant form there was a subsequent
phase of brain evolution in which some of the plastic changes that were
required for the evolution of the eye became increasingly innate, thereby
establishing structures in the brain that are dependent on the existence of
eyes for their functioning.1 This explanation does not account for the reason
this selection in the visual cortex only occurred after the eyes fully evolved.
Another disadvantage of the “side-by-side” evolutionary scenario is that it
requires two evolutionary accounts (and two sets of evolutionary causes), one
for the evolution of A and the other for B, whereas the coevolutionary account
is more parsimonious, since evolutionary changes in one of the traits are
evolutionary causes for changes in the other. These considerations do not rule
out side-by-side evolution but ceteris paribus decrease the prior probability
we should assign to this possibility. Additional evidence supporting such
separate accounts and causes could increase this probability, challenging the
coevolutionary hypothesis.
Symbiotic relationships illustrate side-by-side evolution when the partners
have each evolved in symbiosis with partners different than their current
partner. The functional dependence between the two symbionts is insufficient
evidence for deducing their coevolution (see Dunlap et al. 2007). However,
in such cases it remains true that the functional adaptations for symbiosis
depended on symbiotic partners with the appropriate characters.
4. The Co-Dependence Argument assumes that the functional relationship re-
sults from evolutionary changes in each character. However, developmental
plasticity operating afresh in every generation can also induce functional re-
lationships. The more likely this explains premise (1) or (2) of the Argument,
1. Processes in which selection on developmental outcomes makes them in-
creasingly innate fall under the heading of genetic assimilation and the Baldwin
Effect.
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the weaker the evolutionary conclusion we can draw. Developmental plastic-
ity can be investigated independently of the evolutionary analysis, inform
the characters’ delineation, and help determine constraints on evolutionary
history.
For example, consider bone shape and the manner in which muscles wrap
around the bones in a fully developed organism. The intricate anatomical fit
between the two characters, and the observation that when one is misshapen,
the other also is, may imply co-dependence, enabling the Co-Dependence
Argument. However, the co-dependence may have a developmental account:
muscles flexibly wrap around misshapen bones. This hypothetical plasticity
explains the intricate match between muscle and bone, and also why the
muscles grow in a different shape when the bone is misshapen. The exis-
tence and degree of this flexibility can be investigated independently of the
evolutionary analysis.
Summarizing: We take the Co-Dependence Argument to be a valid inductive
argument, when <<requires>> is instantiated appropriately and depending on the
degree of belief we have in the independence of the two characters and the extent
of their functional dependence.
4. Co-Development and Coevolution
The Co-Dependence Argument suffers from two drawbacks. First, it lends rather
little confirmational support due to its very abstract nature, and it is limited in
the empirical data it suggests to further support or refute the hypothesis. Second,
developmental plasticity limits the applicability of the Argument. In most cases,
even though developmental processes are flexible, species-typical development is
predictable. The argument we discuss now uses the this developmental trajectory,
if it exists, as evidence for coevolution. It applies even in cases involving develop-
mental plasticity, and purports to infer evolutionary relations from observations
about the development of the characters during the life of individuals.
To illustrate, we use the legume-rhizobia symbiosis responsible for nitrogen fixation
by plants. We describe this process schematically by the following stages involving
signals that are unique to the symbiosis of particular species: (1) legume roots
secrete flavanoids; (2) rhizobia bacteria recognize specific flavanoids and secrete
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nod factors; (3) nod factors bind to root hairs and induce their growth in the
direction of the rhizobia and to surround them; (4) the rhizobia enters the root and
(5) secrete chemicals the induce root cell division resulting in root nodules; (6) the
rhizobia change shape, resulting in the formation of bacteroids in which nitrogen
fixation occurs, inside the nodules (see Figure 1).
This example involves two species. Identifying and experimentally manipulating
interactions may be easier in cross-organism interactions, while it may be easier to
gain confidence that signals have a single possible point of origin in cases involving
two subsystems of a single organism. The distinction between the cases may be
blurred. The division of labor between symbiotic organisms may involve critical
life functions, leading to obligatory symbiosis. For example, the gut microbiota in
humans is responsible for critical metabolic processes that the human host lacks
the enzymes for. In the extreme case of endosymbyosis, mitochondria are not
only obligatory for the life of the eukaryotic cell, but during evolution critical
mitochondrial genes moved from the mitochondrial genome to the cell nucleus
cementing the symbiotic relationship.
We represent a developmental system, for present purposes, as an abstract state ma-
chine, or a labelled transition system: it can be in any of a series of discrete stages,
and responds developmentally to external cues depending on its state. These sys-
tems are abstract, and each state may correspond to several developmental stages.
For example, the rhizobia’s developmental state “enter legume roots” consists of
many lower level events. The states in the transition system may correspond to an
easily distinguishable biological phenomenon, such as the state “grow towards nod
factors” in the example above. However, due to uncertainty of experimentation,
data, and depending on explanatory aims, we may decide to group distinct phe-
nomena into a single abstract state. Consider the stages in human psychological
development. Since Piaget, it is common to understand cognitive development as
a series of stages whose order is invariant among individuals, while the precise
age at which individuals attain each stage varies. A well-known example is the
series of stages of moral development proposed by Kohlberg. If reliable, such de-
velopmental evidence is presumably helpful for understanding evolution. However,
the stages are probably not simply mappable onto neurobioloigcal developmental
stages.
The argument we present is based on the following observation. Consider a co-
dependence scenario in which some stimuli of one developmental system must
come from or be filtered by a second developmental system, and are produced
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Figure 1: The developmental interactions of legume and rhizobia
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solely for this purpose and at specific developmental stages. During the systems’
evolution, specific triggers or cues from one system were called upon as devel-
opmental triggers for the other, and enabled specific later developmental stages.
Thus, provided that the triggers (or the propensity to provide them) have sequen-
tially evolved, the two systems’ development would become coupled as a result
of their coevolution. Furthermore, the developmental order of the triggers reflects
their evolutionary order. Should we then suspect coevolution occurred when co-
development is observed? Our argument enables this inference, and allows us to
infer constraints on the evolutionary order that rely on properties of the develop-
ment of the characters in ontogeny. Before presenting this argument, we discuss
the problems inherent in inferring evolutionary relationships from developmental
relationships.
4.1. Developmental evidence for coevolution
Developmental interactions provide support to the functional dependence required
by the Co-Dependence Argument, and can thus support the conclusion that charac-
ters coevolved. Despite its abstract nature and limitations, this developmental use
of the Co-Dependence Argument appears in the literature.
For example, consider the well-known symbiosis between the Hawaiian squid
Euprymna scolopes and the bacterium Vibrio fischeri. Accumulation of the bacteria
in the squid’s light organ causes them to produce light which hides the squid’s
shadow from potential predators and prey. Gilbert and Epel (2009, 91) observe
that,
The squid and the bacterium have coevolved such that each plays
a fundamental role in the other’s development: the squid actively
accumulates a high enough population density of V. fischeri to allow
the bacterium to express its latent bioluminescence, while the bacteria
trigger important morphological changes in the light organ of the host.
(our boldface emphasis)
Both species evolved adaptations that appear specific to their co-developmental
interaction. V. fischeri, but not other bacteria, is attracted to a component of the
mucus secretions of the squid and is probably adapted to adhere to it. The squid, in
turn, responds to the presence of the bacteria with morphological changes (induced
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apoptosis), as well as changes in gene expression, providing the bacteria with a
more hospitable environment for colonization. If each indeed adapted to the other,
we have a case of coevolution.
If the bioluminescence is the only character of the bacteria we appeal to, coevo-
lution would not be a necessary conclusion. The bioluminescence of V. fischeri
could have evolved separately and before the symbiosis (such quorum-sensing
behavior might be beneficial as an anti-predator deterrent) and the squid then
evolved mechanisms to make use of it. All evolutionary changes in this scenario
are on the squid’s side. This is an instance of the side-by-side scenario in which
the Co-Dependence Argument fails. Dunlap et al. (2007) describe such a scenario,
opposing a coevolutionary history of the two species:
Furthermore, the animal requires no obvious biochemical or nutritional
contribution from the bacteria for its growth or development, and the
developmental program giving rise to the light organ and accessory
tissues runs independently of the presence of the host’s native bacteria
(Claes and Dunlap, 2000). This “hard-wiring” of light-organ devel-
opment indicates a significant biological independence of the animal
from bacteria, native or otherwise, in formation of the attribute of the
animal most central to symbiosis, the light organ and its accessory tis-
sues. These general attributes make it difficult to envision the selection
necessary for strict species specificity or codivergence to arise, as well
as for the obligate dependence necessary to facilitate and select for
coevolutionary changes. It is evident from the results presented here
that bacterial affiliations in bioluminescent symbioses are less specific
than previously thought.
Dunlap et al. (2007) thus agree that developmental dependence supports evolu-
tionary interaction, yet find inadequate the evidence for the two species’ strict
dependence. In Section 2, we note the importance of the specificity of the inter-
action for establishing functional dependence. The specificity of developmental
triggers plays the same role. Co-speciation (co-divergence), the scenario Dun-
lap et al. (2007) study, is a specific and strong case of evolutionary specificity
of interaction. To defeat the assumption of specificity, they appeal to evidence
of related host species harboring different bacteria species, instances of multiple
bacterial partners, as well as lack of evidence for parallel patterns of divergence in
the two species’ phylogenetic trees. Ascertaining whether triggers are specific to a
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particular developmental interaction and whether they evolved as adaptations for
this role is in general a non-trivial empirical question.
4.2. Evolutionary order
The Co-Dependence Argument does not use developmental evidence nor provide
conclusions regarding the evolutionary history of the two systems. We focus on
means to infer that developmentally earlier stages have evolved earlier.
The developmental interactions’ order need not match their evolutionary order
— in many cases this conclusion is unlikely. Consider the role of nod factors in
directing root growth in the direction of the rhizobia2. Imagine a scenario in which
the nitrogen fixation symbiosis evolved in densely populated regions, in which
roots are very frequently in contact with the bacteria so that there is no need to
induce and direct root growth. In sparsely populated areas, to which the plants
subsequently migrate, nod factors have an evolutionary advantage (to both plant and
bacteria). In this hypothetical case, nod factors, which are developmentally early,
evolve late, after other interactions that are developmentally later in contemporary
development.
As another example, consider the squid-bacteria symbiosis. If the only selective
advantage from the squid’s perspective is the light emitted by the bacteria inside the
squid’s light organ, earlier developmental stages (e.g., mucus secretions, induced
apoptosis) would not become fixed before the subsequent developmental stages
that produce the functional result exist.
The last two examples illustrate the recapitulation fallacy. They show that co-
developmental order need not (and often would not) match coevolutionary order.
The general problems with inferring phylogeny from ontogeny are notorious.
There is no general reason that ontogeny should follow phylogeny and historically
ontogenetic evidence has led to problematic evolutionary analyses.
However, by restricting our attention to co-developmental interactions we can
present a valid inference pattern and indicate the type of evidence that is required to
support it. The argument we present infers probable constraints on evolutionary or-
der, rather than a specific historical trajectory. Thus, we do not infer that something
appeared earlier in evolution because it appears earlier in development, but rather
infer constraints on evolutionary order based on the relationships between the
2. Assuming root growth is their only function.
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stages of particular developmental processes; that is, based on the role of specific
triggers. Ontogenetic dependence on a trigger can only evolve once the trigger
exists. Compare:
plumulaceous feathers are hypothesized to be primitive to pennaceous
feathers not because the first feathers of extant birds are typically
plumulaceous, but because the simplest differentiated follicle collar
would have grown a plumulaceous feather. (Prum and Brush 2002,
273)
Prum and Brush illustrate that an early developmental stage may have evolved late
provided it does not depend on a trigger from an evolutionarily prior stage for its
initiation. The assumptions in our argument rule out this scenario.
To guard against mistakenly inferring evolutionary order from developmental order,
we recall the concept of generative entrenchment (Schank and Wimsatt 1986). In
a developmental system, the correct behaviour of one stage affects the correct
behaviour of subsequent developmental stages. The degree to which a given stage
affects later stages is its generative entrenchment. Wimsatt and Schank argue that
more generatively entrenched states evolved earlier. There are, of course, scenarios
in which stages that are more generatively entrenched evolved later. For example,
consider the role of language in human cognition. Presumably, many cognitive
functions and stages of cognitive development depend on language, probably more
functions than the number of developmental stages that depend on color vision.
Nevertheless, we have good reasons to think that color vision is prior. Wimsatt
and Schank’s argument suggests that, lacking such reasons, entrenchement is good
evidence for evolutionary order.
We are concerned with a generative entrenchment dependency between two partic-
ular stages, which they call relative generative entrenchment. They argue that a
stage that is relatively more entrenched than another evolved earlier (Schank and
Wimsatt 1986). The essence of their argument is that once a stage evolves, later
stages become reliant on this stage, increasing its relative generative entrenchment
over time. Without additional evidence to explain the relative entrenchment, we
may infer that the developmentally earlier stage (i.e., the more generatively en-
trenched stage) is evolutionarily older. In order to establish the degree of relative
generative entrenchment between two stages of causally connected developmental
processes, we may study the degree in which injury to one induces injury in the
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other. Wimsatt and Schank call the degree in which the later stage becomes non-
functional asymmetric functional dependency, and observe that such dependency
is evidence for relative generative entrenchment. Thus, to determine relative gen-
erative entrenchment relationships between the stages of a development system,
we may experimentally suppress or reinforce particular triggers in the system
in order to evaluate their asymmetric functional effects and, consequently, their
relative generative entrenchment. For example, suppressing the chemical secretion
in the rhizobia may result in no nodule growth, signifying high relative genera-
tive entrenchment. Suppressing the flavanoid secretion in the legume roots while
increasing the rhizobia concentration may result in some rhizobia entering the
legume roots without any need for flavanoids to trigger root growth. In this case,
we would not have enough evidence for high relative generative entrenchment.
4.3. The Co-Development Argument
To formalize the discussion, consider a labeled transition system describing a
character’s development, and a trigger t originating in stage s in that system that
can only be produced by s. If we suppress this trigger, later stages in the system may
not be reached, or may not become fully functional, terminating the development
abnormally. We say that these stages are developmentally dependent on s. If we
consider this developmental dependency for all such triggers in the system, we
obtain a relation we call the development dependency graph, consisting of pairs
of stages s’, s such that, for some trigger t originating only in s, suppression of t
makes s’ dysfunctional or missing.
The Co-Development argument:
Assume labeled transition systems describing the development of two independent
and well-defined hereditary characters A and B such that:
(1) states in B’s development are developmentally dependent on states in A’s
development, and
(2) vice versa.
Then, unless there is contrary evidence, conclude that A and B coevolved.
Moreover, the development dependency graph extends to a constraining partial
order on the evolutionary history of the development systems.
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Justification:
Consider any state s’ that is developmentally dependent on a state s. I.e., there is a
trigger t, supplied only by state s, whose suppression renders state s’ dysfunctional.
Therefore, s’ is asymmetrically functionally dependent on s. Thus s is generatively
entrenched relatively to s’, and hence, according to Wimsatt and Schank, evolved
earlier than s’. Therefore, the development dependency graph forms a constraining
partial order on the evolutionary history of the developmental systems.
Assumption (1) implies there is a state s’ in B’s development that developmentally
depends on a state s in A’s development. By the above argument, s evolved before
s’. It is unlikely that despite s’ evolving after s and relying functionally on s it has
evolved independently of s, and hence s is an evolutionary cause of stage s’. A
symmetric argument shows the dependency of A’s evolution on B’s, hence A and B
coevolved. 
In general, coevolution need not result in co-development. Consider a simple
predator-prey evolutionary arms race. Both predator and prey become fast runners,
each trying to outrun the other. The two species’ running abilities thus coevolve.
It is not true, however, that they then necessarily have to co-develop in ontogeny:
a predator grown in the absence of prey (say in a zoo) may still develop the
musculature etc. needed for fast running, even if not to the exact same extent.
Additionally, other developmental triggers (such as cubs running after each other)
may act as substitutes to interaction with prey. Either way, it is obvious that the
predator and prey do not have to co-develop with one another! In general, the
same external cues (e.g., gravity, sunlight) may influence the development of both
coevolved developmental systems (without the development of one depending on
the other). Even independent cues (such as the genetic cues of each organism) may
contribute to achieving the desired results, provided that the developmental systems
create the appropriate characters at appropriate times in ontogeny. However,
when co-development meeting the conditions outlined above is observed, the Co-
Development Argument supports that hypothesis that the characters coevolved,
and coevolution explains co-development. Our degree of confidence in coevolution
occurring increases with the number of cross-system developmental dependencies,
as each potentially supplies evidence for coevolution.
The development dependency graph contains inter-system edges and intra-system
edges. Both kinds of edges constrain the evolutionary order. For example, the stage
in which the rhizobia secretes the nodule-triggering chemicals might depend on
triggers produced at the stage in which the rhizobia enters the root. More formally:
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if a and a’ are two stages in system A and b a stage in B, such that a’ relatively
depends on b and b relatively depends on a, then by the Co-Development Argument,
a precedes b which preceeds a’ in the evolutionary order, hence a precedes a’.
Therefore, we deduce a constraint on stages of the same system, based on triggers
occurring between two systems.
This inference is useful when the two developmental systems describe two separate
biological systems. For example, the rhizobia’s propensity to secrete chemicals
inducing growth in the legume roots seems tightly coupled with its ability to secrete
nod factors. However, because the mechanisms reside in the same organism, it
is hard to isolate them in order to analyse their relationship. We can use the
dependency with the legume roots’ development to experimentally inhibit or
reinforce the signals between the two systems. More generally, the inter-system
triggers are typically easier to isolate and identify than intra-system triggers, as
stages within the same system cannot be completely separated and might have
hidden dependencies.
The development dependency graph may not be a partial order. For example, con-
sider the scenario in which stage c depends on stage b via trigger s, and b depends
on stage a via trigger t. If t is suppressed, b will become dysfunctional, but it may
still be able to produce s allowing c to develop. This shows that the development
dependency graph may not be transitive and hence not a partial order. However, the
constraints imposed by the dependency graph on the evolutionary history extend to
a (potentially non-total) partial order, because the evolutionary history relation they
restrict is ordered. If we cannot demonstrate a relative dependency between two
stages we do not infer constraints on their evolutionary history, thus the interactive
development of the two systems does not have to exactly match their evolutionary
history.
While we discuss co-development in terms of specific triggers or cues, it is probable
that the interaction does not involve a specific cue flowing between the systems but
rather classes or families of triggers that may elicit the required result. For example,
tigers develop running abilities through play, i.e., cubs chasing each other. The
exact nature of the game is not important, only the fact the game itself exercises
the muscles appropriately. Thus the developmental interaction consists of a class
of triggers (games involving running) rather than a particular form of game.
Similarly, the exact point in the organism’s development in which the cue from
one system is required by the other is probably contingent, as it often depends
on other stimuli. It may be that one system’s development would proceed to
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a,b,c,d,e before the cue needed by the other system is asked for, even though the
first system is ready to provide it once a,b,c have developed. The order most often
observed in ontogeny may in fact be different from the evolutionary order due to
now prevalent external stimuli. This factor may be of particular importance for
the study of cognitive development, since the prevalence of developmental cues
may result from cultural niche construction and developmental scaffolding (e.g.,
intentional teaching, exposure to toys). Such considerations constrain our ability
to deduce evolutionary order based on developmental order, since the observed
species-typical developmental order is probably not determined by developmental
constraints alone, but do not affect the coevolutionary conclusion.
Whether the triggers involved in developmental dependence can be produced else-
where is important for the argument. Among the relevant factors for ascertaining
this are the trigger specificity, trigger consumption context (e.g., does the source
have to be internal to the organism), and the richness of trigger interaction and
complexity (how many triggers, how dependent they are on one another, how
information rich they are).
Two special cases that are of particular importance for cognitive-cultural coevo-
lution make it particularly easy to establish developmental dependence. (1) The
trigger from A may be a response to B, in which case it cannot be produced prior
to B’s need. For example, the social interactions that are required for normal devel-
opment, such as the role of linguistic interactions in the acquisition of language.
(2) The developmental interaction between the two systems may consist of passing
back and forth an artifact, physical or mental, that is successively modified. For
example, consider tool-making, in which a concrete tool is successively fashioned.
Experience with concrete tools and tools in the making affects the development of
both tool-making and tool-use abilities. The developmental interactions between
the two are probably obligatory, since generally tools that exercise tool-use abilities
are outcomes of tool-building.3 In these two cases the trigger’s uniqueness of
origin required by the argument is guaranteed.
3. Many of the tools an infant interacts with are produced by individuals other
than himself. This affects the evolutionary dynamics, but not the co-dependence of
the characters.
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5. Concluding Remarks
We presented arguments that suggest coevolutionary origins based on observations
on synchronic relationship between characters. The Co-Dependence Argument
relies on empirical evidence regarding the nature and extent of the dependency,
on whether the characters and the their precursors were co-dependent as the fully
developed characters are, and on the assumption that no other characters or external
sources could have supplied the necessary resources each character supposedly
required from the other in prior stages of their evolution.
The Co-Development Argument complements the Co-Dependence Argument in
two ways. First, it provides additional suggestions for empirical work by showing
the importance of the analysis of the developmental dependencies between the
developmental systems. Examples of relevant questions include: the extent to
which the development and functioning of each system depends on the normal
functioning of the other (this can be deduced by studying individuals in which one
of the systems is injured either accidentally or deliberately); the specificity and
complexity of the triggers; identifying the classes of triggers each system provides
the other and their molecular basis, if relevant; and ascertaining the variation in
developmental order among normal individuals and whether the observed order of
developmental stages is in accordance with the prediction based on coevolution.
Second, while in the Co-Dependence Argument developmental and evolutionary
explanations competed, the Co-Development Argument uses co-developmental
dependencies to strengthen the coevolutionary conclusion. The Argument attempts
to deduce coevolutionary consequences from the observed predictable develop-
mental trajectories of characters. In particular, it allows us to infer constraints
regarding the plausible coevolutionary history that led to them. We showed that the
extent to which each system plastically reacts to changes in the other can be used
to infer evolutionary constraints. Based on such developmental considerations,
the Co-Development Argument provides constraints on the plausible evolutionary
history, that the Co-Dependence Argument does not provide. We analysed the
extent to which such inferences are possible.
We argued that the Co-Development Argument is especially applicable to the anal-
ysis of cognitive evolution: large amounts of developmental data exist, including
cross-cultural data and data on pathologies, while the genetic and neural bases of
the characters are highly complex and it is difficult to study their evolution directly.
In addition, diachronic evidence for cognitive characters is particularly hard to
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establish since behavior does not fossilize and interpretation of available evidence
(e.g., evidence of tools and tool use) is notoriously difficult. In contrast, some of the
triggers affecting cognitive development occur in conversational settings or involve
persistent artifacts, and such triggers make it easier to establish the developmental
dependence that the Co-Development Argument uses as evidence.
Considering the plasticity of the central nervous system, the observed predictable
developmental trajectory of some cognitive characters such as moral cognition
and language is surprising. The developmental scaffolding provided by social
institutions and culture more generally may be crucial for this predictability. This
scaffolding suggests the possibility of coevolution between the characters requiring
the social scaffolding and the cognitive characters enabling this scaffolding. The Co-
Development Argument is particularly well-suited for analyzing such coevolution,
and thus has the potential to allow cognitive-cultural coevolution accounts to take
advantage of co-developmental evidence.
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